A limit theorem on the core

DOI10.1016/0304-4068(76)90011-2zbMath0367.90031OpenAlexW1994750214MaRDI QIDQ5905981

Walter Trockel

Publication date: 1976

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(76)90011-2

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games with infinitely many players (91A07) Trade models (91B60)

Related Items

STRATEGIC EQUILIBRIA WITH PARTIALLY CONSUMABLE WITHHOLDINGS ⋮ Modeling large societies: why countable additivity is necessary ⋮ A limit theorem on the core ⋮ The asymptotic core, nucleolus and Shapley value of smooth market games with symmetric large players ⋮ Walrasian analysis via two-player games ⋮ Cournot-Nash and Lindahl equilibria in pure public good economies

Cites Work

• On equilibrium allocations as distributions on the commodity space
• A note on the space of preference relations
• Oligopoly in Markets with a Continuum of Traders
• Edgeworth-Allocations in an Exchange Economy with Many Traders
• Markets with a Continuum of Traders
• Existence of Competitive Equilibria in Markets with a Continuum of Traders
• Continuity Properties of the Core of a Market
• An Equivalence Theorem for the Core of an Economy Whose Atoms Are Not "Too" Big
• A limit theorem on the cores of large standard exchange economies
• A Limit Theorem on the Core of an Economy
• A limit theorem on the core
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