The asymptotic core, nucleolus and Shapley value of smooth market games with symmetric large players

DOI10.1007/s00182-014-0422-1zbMath1311.91010OpenAlexW1988483414MaRDI QIDQ2259417

Benyamin Shitovitz, Anna Rubinchik, Avishay Aiche

Publication date: 4 March 2015

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hevra.haifa.ac.il/econ/wp_files/wp201509.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

oligopolyasymptotic Shapley valueasymptotic nucleolusmixed games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Related Items (3)

On the equal treatment imputations subset in the bargaining set for smooth vector-measure games with a mixed measure space of players ⋮ The asymptotic kernel in TU production market games with symmetric big players and a uniform ocean of small players ⋮ A heuristic procedure for computing the nucleolus

Cites Work

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• Values of mixed games
• Monopoly, syndicate, and Shapley value: About some conjectures
• The asymptotic nucleolus of large monopolistic market games
• Partially Symmetric Values
• Asymptotic Value of Mixed Games
• Values of Non-Atomic Games
• Oligopoly in Markets with a Continuum of Traders
• Markets with a Continuum of Traders
• The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game
• Asymptotic Values of Vector Measure Games
• A limit theorem on the core

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