On the equal treatment imputations subset in the bargaining set for smooth vector-measure games with a mixed measure space of players

DOI10.1007/s00182-018-0632-zzbMath1417.91032OpenAlexW2808383524MaRDI QIDQ2002061

Avishay Aiche

Publication date: 11 July 2019

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-018-0632-z

zbMATH Keywords

bargaining setvector measure gamesTU market games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Related Items (1)

Generalized coalitions and bargaining sets

Cites Work

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• Coincidence of the Mas-Colell bargaining set and the set of competitive equilibria in a continuum coalition production economy
• An equivalence theorem for a bargaining set
• Some notes on the core of a production economy with some large traders and a continuum of small traders
• The bargaining set and the core in mixed markets with atoms and an atomless sector
• Core equivalence theorems for infinite convex games
• Existence of competitive equilibrium in coalition production economies with a continuum of agents
• The asymptotic core, nucleolus and Shapley value of smooth market games with symmetric large players
• Values of Non-Atomic Games
• Oligopoly in Markets with a Continuum of Traders
• Markets with a Continuum of Traders

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