Core equivalence theorems for infinite convex games

DOI10.1006/JETH.1997.2304zbMATH Open0883.90136OpenAlexW1976389051MaRDI QIDQ1371185FDOQ1371185

Authors: Ezra Einy, Ron Holzman, Dov Monderer, Benyamin Shitovitz 

Publication date: 28 October 1997

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/22e2462354d8e11bfddf1d6409a3e446f35dafb6

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zbMATH Keywords

von Neumann-Morgenstern stable setMas-Colell bargaining setmeasurable space of playerscore of a continuous convex game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games with infinitely many players (91A07)

Cites Work

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Cited In (14)

• On the least core and the Mas-Colell bargaining set
• Representation of the core of convex measure games via Kantorovich potentials
• Convex vNM-stable sets for linear production games
• Some generalizations of Kajii's theorem to games with infinitely many players
• On the equal treatment imputations subset in the bargaining set for smooth vector-measure games with a mixed measure space of players
• A generalization of the Shapley-ichiishi result
• The bargaining set for almost-convex games
• A game-theoretic equivalence to the Hahn-Banach theorem
• Invariant equilibria and classes of equivalent games
• The core of continuous convex games with countable many players
• The bargaining set of a large game
• A new class of convex games on \(\sigma\)-algebras and the optimal partitioning of measurable spaces
• Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets in matching problems
• von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets of income tax rates in public good economies

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