Core equivalence theorems for infinite convex games
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Cites work
- A consistent bargaining set
- A proof that the core of an ordinal convex game is a von Neumann- Morgenstern solution
- An equivalence theorem for a bargaining set
- Canonical Representation of Set Functions
- Convex games and extreme points
- Convex games and stable sets
- Core and stable sets of large games arising in economics
- Cores of convex games
- Cores of exact games. I
- Equivalence between bargaining sets and the core in simple games
- Finitely Additive Measures
- Game theoretic analysis of a bankruptcy problem from the Talmud
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1099359 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1099364 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1099365 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3214144 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3257031 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3078998 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3106184 (Why is no real title available?)
- Integral Representation Without Additivity
- Markets with a Continuum of Traders
- Nonmanipulable Cores
- On general minimax theorems
- On the sensitivity of von Neumann and Morgenstern abstract stable sets: The stable and the individual stable bargaining set
- The bargaining set and the core in mixed markets with atoms and an atomless sector
- The kernel and bargaining set for convex games
- The theory of social situations. A game-theoretic approach.
Cited in
(18)- On the least core and the Mas-Colell bargaining set
- Stability of the core mapping in games with a countable set of players
- The least core, kernel and bargaining sets of large games
- Some generalizations of Kajii's theorem to games with infinitely many players
- On the non-compactness of the core of nonatomic convex \(\sigma\)-continuous measure games
- On the equal treatment imputations subset in the bargaining set for smooth vector-measure games with a mixed measure space of players
- Invariant equilibria and classes of equivalent games
- The bargaining set for almost-convex games
- Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets in matching problems
- Convex games and stable sets
- Representation of the core of convex measure games via Kantorovich potentials
- A game-theoretic equivalence to the Hahn-Banach theorem
- The core of continuous convex games with countable many players
- Convex vNM-stable sets for linear production games
- A generalization of the Shapley-ichiishi result
- A new class of convex games on \(\sigma\)-algebras and the optimal partitioning of measurable spaces
- von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets of income tax rates in public good economies
- The bargaining set of a large game
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