Nonmanipulable Cores
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Publication:3773731
DOI10.2307/1911261zbMath0634.90101OpenAlexW4235154496MaRDI QIDQ3773731
Publication date: 1987
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/1911261
Related Items (17)
Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets in matching problems ⋮ ``How characteristic are characteristic functions? ⋮ Strategy-proofness of worker-optimal matching with continuously transferable utility ⋮ Core equivalence theorems for infinite convex games ⋮ Convex and exact games with non-transferable utility ⋮ A unified approach to strategy-proofness of the deferred-acceptance rule and the top-trading cycles rule ⋮ Lone wolves in competitive equilibria ⋮ A coalitional game-theoretic model of stable government forms with umpires ⋮ On strongly consistent social choice functions ⋮ Computational complexity to verify the unstability of effectivity function ⋮ Strategy-proofness and essentially single-valued cores revisited ⋮ Two-sided strategy-proofness in many-to-many matching markets ⋮ Moral hazard and stability ⋮ Coalitionally strategy-proof social choice correspondences and the Pareto rule ⋮ The strategy structure of some coalition formation games ⋮ Core implementation and increasing returns to scale for cooperation ⋮ The production and cost-sharing of an excludable public good
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