Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets in matching problems
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Publication:2373788
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2006.03.006zbMath1156.91441MaRDI QIDQ2373788
Publication date: 16 July 2007
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2006.03.006
91B68: Matching models
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