Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets in matching problems

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2006.03.006MaRDI QIDQ2373788zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Lars Ehlers

Publication date 16 July 2007

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2006.03.006

zbMATH Keywords

matching problemvon Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

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Cites work

• A new bargaining set of an \(N\)-person game and endogenous coalition formation
• A proof that the core of an ordinal convex game is a von Neumann- Morgenstern solution
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
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• Core equivalence theorems for infinite convex games
• Core many-to-one matchings by fixed-point methods
• Cores of convex games
• Every finite distributive lattice is a set of stable matchings
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3558960 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3106184 (Why is no real title available?)
• Nonmanipulable Cores
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• Single agents and the set of many-to-one stable matchings
• Stability and largeness of the core
• Stable schedule matching under revealed preference.
• Symmetric von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets in pure exchange economies.
• The Lattice Structure of the Set of Stable Matchings with Multiple Partners
• Weak stability and a bargaining set for the marriage model

Cited in

(45)

• The foundation of stability in extensive games with perfect information
• A further note on the stable matching problem
• Consistency and characterization of the core of two-sided matching problems
• Three remarks on the many-to-many stable matching problem
• Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets of a patent licensing game: the existence proof
• Core many-to-one matchings by fixed-point methods
• A polynomial-time algorithm to find von Neumann-Morgenstern stable matchings in marriage games
• Subgame perfect equilibria under the deferred acceptance algorithm
• Weak stability and Pareto efficiency in school choice
• Farsighted stability with heterogeneous expectations
• Essentially stable matchings
• Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set rationalization of choice functions
• Matching with myopic and farsighted players
• Stability of networks under horizon-\(K\) farsightedness
• Roth-Postlewaite stability and von Neumann-Morgenstern stability
• Competitive equilibrium and singleton cores in generalized matching problems
• Stable sets in matching problems with coalitional sovereignty and path dominance
• Absorbing sets in roommate problems
• Von Neumann-Morgenstern solutions in the assignment market
• Characterization of the core in full domain marriage problems
• Stability properties of the core in a generalized assignment problem
• Stability against robust deviations in the roommate problem
• Farsighted objections and maximality in one-to-one matching problems
• The minimum set of \(\mu\)-compatible subgames for obtaining a stable set in an assignment game
• Responsive affirmative action in school choice
• von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets in two-sided matching
• Political mergers as coalition formation: an analysis of the \textit{Heisei} municipal amalgamations
• Dominance invariant one-to-one matching problems
• On the existence of a strictly strong Nash equilibrium under the student-optimal deferred acceptance algorithm
• Legal Assignments and Fast EADAM with Consent via Classic Theory of Stable Matchings
• Cooperative games (von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets)
• Singles monotonicity and stability in one-to-one matching problems
• The core of school choice problems
• A perfectly robust approach to multiperiod matching problems
• Stable allocations in discrete exchange economies
• School choice with farsighted students
• The properness of weak stability notions
• Matching markets with farsighted couples
• A note on the characterization of stable matchings for general preferences: a fixed point approach
• Von Neumann-Morgenstern stability and internal closedness in matching theory
• Von Neumann-Morgenstern stability and internal closedness in matching theory
• Existence of myopic-farsighted stable sets in matching markets
• Dynamic stable set as a tournament solution
• A one-shot deviation principle for stability in matching problems
• von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets of income tax rates in public good economies

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