Consistency and characterization of the core of two-sided matching problems

From MaRDI portal
Publication:1183707

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(92)90078-VzbMath0763.90040OpenAlexW2085973367MaRDI QIDQ1183707

Manabu Toda, Hiroo Sasaki

Publication date: 28 June 1992

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(92)90078-v




Related Items (27)

Minimal consistent enlargements of the immediate acceptance rule and the top trading cycles rule in school choiceVon Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets in matching problemsConsistency and monotonicity in assignment problemsConsistent extensionsLocal and global consistency properties for student placementConsistent enlargements of the core in roommate problemsDistance on matchings: An axiomatic approachConsistent queueing rulesSingles monotonicity and stability in one-to-one matching problemsA note on gender fairness in matching problems.Minimal conversely consistent extension of the men-optimal solutionAn incompatibility between recursive unanimity and strategy-proofness in two-sided matching problemsConsistency and population sensitivity properties in marriage and roommate marketsCharacterization of the core in full domain marriage problemsOn the existence of consistent rules to adjudicate conflicting claims: a constructive geometric approachOn societies choosing social outcomes, and their memberships: internal stability and consistencyTHE CORE AND CONSISTENCY PROPERTIES: A GENERAL CHARACTERISATIONMonotonicity and consistency in matching marketsConsistency and its converse for roommate marketsImpossibilities for roommate problemsStability and efficiency of partitions in matching problemsDecentralized matching: the role of commitmentConsistency and its converse: an introductionAxiomatic foundations of the core for games in effectiveness formConsistency in house allocation problemsImplementable stable solutions to pure matching problemsAxiomatization of the core of assignment games



Cites Work


This page was built for publication: Consistency and characterization of the core of two-sided matching problems