Consistency and characterization of the core of two-sided matching problems
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1183707
DOI10.1016/0022-0531(92)90078-VzbMath0763.90040OpenAlexW2085973367MaRDI QIDQ1183707
Publication date: 28 June 1992
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(92)90078-v
Game theory (91A99) Edge subsets with special properties (factorization, matching, partitioning, covering and packing, etc.) (05C70) Mathematical economics (91B99)
Related Items (27)
Minimal consistent enlargements of the immediate acceptance rule and the top trading cycles rule in school choice ⋮ Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets in matching problems ⋮ Consistency and monotonicity in assignment problems ⋮ Consistent extensions ⋮ Local and global consistency properties for student placement ⋮ Consistent enlargements of the core in roommate problems ⋮ Distance on matchings: An axiomatic approach ⋮ Consistent queueing rules ⋮ Singles monotonicity and stability in one-to-one matching problems ⋮ A note on gender fairness in matching problems. ⋮ Minimal conversely consistent extension of the men-optimal solution ⋮ An incompatibility between recursive unanimity and strategy-proofness in two-sided matching problems ⋮ Consistency and population sensitivity properties in marriage and roommate markets ⋮ Characterization of the core in full domain marriage problems ⋮ On the existence of consistent rules to adjudicate conflicting claims: a constructive geometric approach ⋮ On societies choosing social outcomes, and their memberships: internal stability and consistency ⋮ THE CORE AND CONSISTENCY PROPERTIES: A GENERAL CHARACTERISATION ⋮ Monotonicity and consistency in matching markets ⋮ Consistency and its converse for roommate markets ⋮ Impossibilities for roommate problems ⋮ Stability and efficiency of partitions in matching problems ⋮ Decentralized matching: the role of commitment ⋮ Consistency and its converse: an introduction ⋮ Axiomatic foundations of the core for games in effectiveness form ⋮ Consistency in house allocation problems ⋮ Implementable stable solutions to pure matching problems ⋮ Axiomatization of the core of assignment games
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- An axiomatization of the core of cooperative games without side payments
- On the reduced game property and its converse
- The tracing procedure: A Bayesian approach to defining a solution for n- person noncooperative games
- The Bargaining Problem
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
This page was built for publication: Consistency and characterization of the core of two-sided matching problems
