Axiomatization of the core of assignment games

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2004.09.006zbMATH Open1122.91016OpenAlexW1991581721MaRDI QIDQ815216FDOQ815216

Authors: Manabu Toda 

Publication date: 16 February 2006

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2004.09.006

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zbMATH Keywords

consistencycorepopulation monotonicityassignment games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• The assignment game. I: The core
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• The kernel of a cooperative game
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• Comparative statics in matching markets
• Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
• The Strategy Structure of Two-Sided Matching Markets
• The Fair Division of a Fixed Supply Among a Growing Population
• Monotonicity of bargaining solutions with respect to the disagreement point
• Consistency and characterization of the core of two-sided matching problems
• Equilibrium in a discrete exchange economy with money
• Core and competitive equilibria with indivisibilities
• Characterization of cores of assignment games
• Consistency and monotonicity in assignment problems
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Monotonicity and consistency in matching markets
• The core of the matching game
• A weak monotonicity property of the nucleolus

Cited In (27)

• Axiomatic foundations of the core for games in effectiveness form
• An alternative proof of the characterization of core stability for the assignment game
• Another proof that assignment games have singleton cores only if multiple optimal matchings exist
• Consistent enlargements of the core in roommate problems
• On axiomatizations of the Shapley value for assignment games
• Consistency and characterization of the core of two-sided matching problems
• Consistency in one-sided assignment problems
• An axiomatization of the nucleolus of assignment markets
• Axiomatization and Core Stability of Allocation Rules for Hypergraph Situations
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Axiomatization of an allocation rule for ordered tree TU-games
• Convex decomposition of games and axiomatizations of the core and the D-core
• Constrained-optimal tradewise-stable outcomes in the one-sided assignment game: a solution concept weaker than the core
• The stable fixtures problem with payments
• Monotonicity and consistency in matching markets
• Valuation monotonicity, fairness and stability in assignment problems
• The assignment game: the \(\tau\)-value
• Population monotonicity in matching games
• The \textit{ex ante} incentive compatible core of the assignment game.
• Consistency and monotonicity in assignment problems
• A survey on assignment markets
• Axiomatizations and applications of the duplicate core: a case study on sport management
• An Axiomatization of the Core of Market Games
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Core theory for multiple-sided assignment games
• Impossibilities for roommate problems
• Generalized three-sided assignment markets: core consistency and competitive prices

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