Axiomatization of the core of assignment games
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Publication:815216
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2004.09.006zbMath1122.91016MaRDI QIDQ815216
Publication date: 16 February 2006
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2004.09.006
Related Items
Constrained-optimal tradewise-stable outcomes in the one-sided assignment game: a solution concept weaker than the core, Generalized three-sided assignment markets: core consistency and competitive prices, On axiomatizations of the Shapley value for assignment games, Consistent enlargements of the core in roommate problems, A survey on assignment markets, Impossibilities for roommate problems, The stable fixtures problem with payments, Consistency in one-sided assignment problems, Valuation monotonicity, fairness and stability in assignment problems, Population monotonicity in matching games, An axiomatization of the nucleolus of assignment markets
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