Valuation monotonicity, fairness and stability in assignment problems
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Recommendations
- Consistency and monotonicity in assignment problems
- Pairwise stability in two sided market with strictly increasing valuation functions
- Consistent bilateral assignment
- On axiomatizations of the Shapley value for assignment games
- Axioms for the optimal stable rules and fair-division rules in a multiple-partners job market
Cites work
- An axiomatization of the nucleolus of assignment markets
- An axiomatization of the Shapley value using a fairness property
- Axiomatization of the core of assignment games
- Axioms for deferred acceptance
- Buyer-seller exactness in the assignment game
- Coalition strategy-proofness and monotonicity in Shapley-Scarf housing markets
- Consistency and monotonicity in assignment problems
- Efficient Resource Allocation on the Basis of Priorities
- Entry and structures of interest groups in assignment games
- Graphs and Cooperation in Games
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3733695 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3771380 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48303 (Why is no real title available?)
- Monotonic solutions of cooperative games
- On axiomatizations of the Shapley value for assignment games
- On the incentive properties of multi-item auctions.
- On the manipulability of competitive equilibrium rules in many-to-many buyer-seller markets
- Population monotonic allocation schemes for cooperative games with transferable utility
- Reconciling marginalism with egalitarianism: consistency, monotonicity, and implementation of egalitarian Shapley values
- The assignment game. I: The core
- The assignment game: the \(\tau\)-value
- The Strategy Structure of Two-Sided Matching Markets
- Von Neumann-Morgenstern solutions in the assignment market
Cited in
(6)- Consistent bilateral assignment
- Axioms for the optimal stable rules and fair-division rules in a multiple-partners job market
- Characterization and algorithm for bivariate multi-unit assignment valuations
- Sensitivity of fair prices in assignment markets
- Political power on a line graph
- Simple manipulations of Walrasian equilibrium rules in assignment problems
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