Simple manipulations of Walrasian equilibrium rules in assignment problems

DOI10.1007/S00355-025-01645-3MaRDI QIDQ7389713zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Marina Núñez, Francisco Robles, Laura Robles

Publication date 2026

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/S00355-025-01645-3

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) General equilibrium theory (91B50)

Cites work

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