Characterization of the Walrasian equilibria of the assignment model
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Publication:845010
DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2009.05.008zbMATH Open1197.91138OpenAlexW2167152832MaRDI QIDQ845010FDOQ845010
Publication date: 5 February 2010
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://research.tilburguniversity.edu/en/publications/3e249b02-c0f4-4ccf-bd37-f9e693fb7ad8
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Cites Work
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- Walrasian equilibrium with gross substitutes
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- The extremal length of a network
- Maximum-Minimum Sätze über Graphen
- Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
- On Representatives of Subsets
- The Strategy Structure of Two-Sided Matching Markets
- Incentives in Teams
- Multi-item Vickrey-Dutch auctions
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- Characterization of cores of assignment games
- The English auction with differentiated commodities
- On ascending Vickrey auctions for heterogeneous objects
- On a dynamic auction mechanism for a bilateral assignment problem
- Interior points in the core of two-sided matching markets
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Cited In (22)
- Multi-item Vickrey-English-Dutch auctions
- The discrete separation theorem and price adjustment directions in markets with heterogeneous commodities
- A local independence condition for characterization of Walrasian allocations rule
- Perfect competition in the continuous assignment model
- A competitive partnership formation process
- How to efficiently allocate houses under price controls?
- The nonatomic assignment model
- Assignment models for constrained marginals and restricted markets
- Comparative statics of assignment markets with general utilities
- An étude in modeling the definability of equilibrium
- Walrasian's characterization and a universal ascending auction
- Separating equilibrium in quasi-linear signaling games
- A characterization of equilibria in the Groves-Ledyard mechanism
- The structure of competitive equilibria in an assignment market
- An assignment model with local constraints: competitive equilibrium and ascending auction
- A graph theoretic approach to markets for indivisible goods
- Sensitivity of fair prices in assignment markets
- A speedy auction using approximated bidders' preferences
- Core and Walrasian equilibria when agents' characteristics are extremely dispersed
- Sets in excess demand in simple ascending auctions with unit-demand bidders
- Strategy-proofness and efficiency for non-quasi-linear and common-tiered-object preferences: characterization of minimum price rule
- Multi-object auction design beyond quasi-linearity: leading examples
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