Characterization of the Walrasian equilibria of the assignment model
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Cites work
- Characterization of cores of assignment games
- Existence of an Equilibrium for a Competitive Economy
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48303 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1768785 (Why is no real title available?)
- Incentives in Teams
- Interior points in the core of two-sided matching markets
- Job matching with heterogeneous firms and workers
- Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
- Maximum-Minimum Sätze über Graphen
- Multi-item Vickrey-Dutch auctions
- On a dynamic auction mechanism for a bilateral assignment problem
- On ascending Vickrey auctions for heterogeneous objects
- On Representatives of Subsets
- The assignment game. I: The core
- The English auction with differentiated commodities
- The extremal length of a network
- The Strategy Structure of Two-Sided Matching Markets
- Walrasian equilibrium with gross substitutes
Cited in
(25)- Perfect competition in the continuous assignment model
- A local independence condition for characterization of Walrasian allocations rule
- The nonatomic assignment model
- Core and Walrasian equilibria when agents' characteristics are extremely dispersed
- Strategy-proofness and efficiency for non-quasi-linear and common-tiered-object preferences: characterization of minimum price rule
- Comparative statics of assignment markets with general utilities
- Walrasian's characterization and a universal ascending auction
- A competitive partnership formation process
- A speedy auction using approximated bidders' preferences
- Foundations of pseudomarkets: Walrasian equilibria for discrete resources
- Separating equilibrium in quasi-linear signaling games
- The discrete separation theorem and price adjustment directions in markets with heterogeneous commodities
- An assignment model with local constraints: competitive equilibrium and ascending auction
- Multi-item Vickrey-English-Dutch auctions
- The structure of competitive equilibria in an assignment market
- Sets in excess demand in simple ascending auctions with unit-demand bidders
- A graph theoretic approach to markets for indivisible goods
- How to efficiently allocate houses under price controls?
- Assignment models for constrained marginals and restricted markets
- Multi-object auction design beyond quasi-linearity: leading examples
- An étude in modeling the definability of equilibrium
- A characterization of equilibria in the Groves-Ledyard mechanism
- Sensitivity of fair prices in assignment markets
- An efficient and incentive-compatible dynamic multi-item auction under budget constraints
- The ascending auction with flexible reporting
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