Sets in excess demand in simple ascending auctions with unit-demand bidders
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Publication:2449341
DOI10.1007/s10479-013-1344-1zbMath1287.91081MaRDI QIDQ2449341
Christer Andersson, Tommy Andersson, Adolphus J. J. Talman
Publication date: 8 May 2014
Published in: Annals of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-013-1344-1
91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models
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