Sets in excess demand in simple ascending auctions with unit-demand bidders

DOI10.1007/S10479-013-1344-1MaRDI QIDQ2449341zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Tommy Andersson, Christer Andersson, Dolf Talman

Publication date 8 May 2014

Published in Annals of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-013-1344-1

zbMATH Keywords

algorithmsexcess demandmulti-item auctionsunit-demand

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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Cites work

• An Efficient Multi-Unit Ascending Auction
• Characterization of the Walrasian equilibria of the assignment model
• Combinatorial auctions
• Exchanging heterogeneous goods via sealed bid auctions and transportation systems
• Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods and Criteria of Justice
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3185418 (Why is no real title available?)
• Large Indivisibles: An Analysis with Respect to Price Equilibrium and Fairness
• Maximal Flow Through a Network
• Non-manipulable assignment of individuals to positions revisited
• On a dynamic auction mechanism for a bilateral assignment problem
• On Representatives of Subsets
• Properties of the DGS-auction algorithm
• Room assignment-rent division: a market approach
• The assignment game. I: The core
• The auction algorithm: A distributed relaxation method for the assignment problem
• The English auction with differentiated commodities
• The Strategy Structure of Two-Sided Matching Markets

Cited in

(14)

• A multi-item auction with budget-constrained bidders and price controls
• The problem of multiple commons: a market design approach
• Time bounds for iterative auctions: a unified approach by discrete convex analysis
• Walrasian's characterization and a universal ascending auction
• A competitive partnership formation process
• A speedy auction using approximated bidders' preferences
• An assignment model with local constraints: competitive equilibrium and ascending auction
• A method for finding the maximal set in excess demand
• Multi-item Vickrey-English-Dutch auctions
• Properties of the DGS-auction algorithm
• An efficient and incentive-compatible dynamic multi-item auction under budget constraints
• A globally convergent alternating one-track auction for gross substitutes and complements
• The ascending auction with flexible reporting
• Immediate demand reduction in simultaneous ascending-bid auctions: a uniqueness result

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