Large Indivisibles: An Analysis with Respect to Price Equilibrium and Fairness

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Publication:3040875

DOI10.2307/1912044zbMath0526.90017OpenAlexW2161252879MaRDI QIDQ3040875

Lars-Gunnar Svensson

Publication date: 1983

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/1912044




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