No-envy, solidarity, and strategy-proofness in the queueing problem
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Publication:2178588
DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2020.03.003zbMATH Open1437.91242OpenAlexW3014087330MaRDI QIDQ2178588FDOQ2178588
Publication date: 11 May 2020
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2020.03.003
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Queues and service in operations research (90B22) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Mechanism design theory (91B03)
Cites Work
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- Incentives in Teams
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- Characterizations of Pareto-efficient, fair, and strategy-proof allocation rules in queueing problems
- Fair queueing
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- No-envy and egalitarian-equivalence under multi-object-demand for heterogeneous objects
- Characterizations of strategy-proof and fair mechanisms for allocating indivisible goods
- Egalitarian equivalence and strategyproofness in the queueing problem
- Characterizations of pivotal mechanisms in the queueing problem
- Welfare lower bounds and strategy-proofness in the queueing problem
Cited In (4)
- A characterization of the Vickrey rule in slot allocation problems
- Generalized welfare lower bounds and strategyproofness in sequencing problems
- Weak group strategy-proof and queue-efficient mechanisms for the queueing problem with multiple machines
- Welfare lower bounds and strategy-proofness in the queueing problem
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