No-envy, solidarity, and strategy-proofness in the queueing problem

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2020.03.003MaRDI QIDQ2178588zbMATHOpenAlexFDO

Authors Duygu Yengin, Youngsub Chun

Publication date 11 May 2020

Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2020.03.003

zbMATH Keywords

no-envystrategy-proofnessqueueing problemVCG mechanismsolidaritypivotal mechanism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Queues and service in operations research (90B22) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Recommendations

• Characterizations of pivotal mechanisms in the queueing problem
• No-envy in queueing problems
• Egalitarian equivalence and strategyproofness in the queueing problem
• No-envy in the queueing problem with multiple identical machines
• Characterizations of Pareto-efficient, fair, and strategy-proof allocation rules in queueing problems

Cites work

• A characterization of the Shapley value in queueing problems
• A pessimistic approach to the queueing problem
• Characterizations of Pareto-efficient, fair, and strategy-proof allocation rules in queueing problems
• Characterizations of pivotal mechanisms in the queueing problem
• Characterizations of strategy-proof and fair mechanisms for allocating indivisible goods
• Characterizing welfare-egalitarian mechanisms with solidarity when valuations are private information
• Egalitarian equivalence and strategyproofness in the queueing problem
• Egalitarian-equivalent Groves mechanisms in the allocation of heterogeneous objects
• Fair queueing
• Group strategyproofness in queueing models
• Groves sealed bid auctions of heterogeneous objects with fair prices
• Groves' Scheme on Restricted Domains
• Incentives in Teams
• Large Indivisibles: An Analysis with Respect to Price Equilibrium and Fairness
• Mechanism design in queueing problems
• Monotonicity and envyfree assignments
• No-envy and egalitarian-equivalence under multi-object-demand for heterogeneous objects
• No-envy in queueing problems
• On Scheduling Fees to Prevent Merging, Splitting, and Transferring of Jobs
• Population monotonic and strategy-proof mechanisms respecting welfare lower bounds
• Population-monotonic solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked
• Problems of fair division and the egalitarian solution
• Scheduling with Opting Out: Improving upon Random Priority
• The Fair Division of a Fixed Supply Among a Growing Population
• Welfare lower bounds and strategy-proofness in the queueing problem

Cited in

(15)

• Generalized welfare lower bounds and strategyproofness in sequencing problems
• Prior-free online mechanisms for queueing with arrivals
• Egalitarian equivalence and strategyproofness in the queueing problem
• A characterization of the Vickrey rule in slot allocation problems
• Strategy-proof and anonymous rule in queueing problems: a relationship between equity and efficiency
• A characterization of the symmetrically balanced VCG rule in the queueing problem
• Fair queueing
• A pessimistic approach to the queueing problem
• No-envy in queueing problems
• Weak group strategy-proof and queue-efficient mechanisms for the queueing problem with multiple machines
• Welfare lower bounds and strategy-proofness in the queueing problem
• No-envy in the queueing problem with multiple identical machines
• Subgroup additivity in the queueing problem
• Consistent queueing rules
• Characterizations of pivotal mechanisms in the queueing problem

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