Group strategyproofness in queueing models
From MaRDI portal
Publication:536097
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2010.06.011zbMath1236.90035OpenAlexW1995034472MaRDI QIDQ536097
Manipushpak Mitra, Suresh Mutuswami
Publication date: 16 May 2011
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://repository.essex.ac.uk/8901/1/dp610.pdf
Queues and service in operations research (90B22) Group preferences (91B10) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
Related Items (17)
Subgroup additivity in the queueing problem ⋮ Incentives and justice for sequencing problems ⋮ No-envy, solidarity, and strategy-proofness in the queueing problem ⋮ Egalitarianism in the queueing problem ⋮ Recent developments in the queueing problem ⋮ Weak group strategy-proof and queue-efficient mechanisms for the queueing problem with multiple machines ⋮ Collusion-proof mechanisms for multi-unit procurement ⋮ Balanced VCG mechanisms for sequencing problems ⋮ Strategy-proof and anonymous rule in queueing problems: a relationship between equity and efficiency ⋮ Reordering an existing queue ⋮ Characterizations of pivotal mechanisms in the queueing problem ⋮ Fair and group strategy-proof good allocation with money ⋮ Egalitarian equivalence and strategyproofness in the queueing problem ⋮ Welfare lower bounds and strategy-proofness in the queueing problem ⋮ Switching queues, cultural conventions, and social welfare ⋮ A characterization of the symmetrically balanced VCG rule in the queueing problem ⋮ Prior-free online mechanisms for queueing with arrivals
Cites Work
- Incomplete information and multiple machine queueing problems
- A characterization of the Shapley value in queueing problems
- Achieving the first best in sequencing problems.
- Strategyproofness, non-bossiness and group strategyproofness in a cost sharing model
- Pairwise strategy-proofness and self-enforcing manipulation
- Incentives in Teams
- Groves' Scheme on Restricted Domains
- Random Matching Under Dichotomous Preferences
- Mechanism design in queueing problems
- Strategyproof sharing of submodular costs: budget balance versus efficiency
This page was built for publication: Group strategyproofness in queueing models
