Group strategyproofness in queueing models
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Publication:536097
Recommendations
- Weak group strategy-proof and queue-efficient mechanisms for the queueing problem with multiple machines
- Characterizations of pivotal mechanisms in the queueing problem
- Egalitarian equivalence and strategyproofness in the queueing problem
- Fair and group strategy-proof good allocation with money
- Group strategyproof cost sharing: the role of indifferences
Cites Work
- A characterization of the Shapley value in queueing problems
- Achieving the first best in sequencing problems.
- Groves' Scheme on Restricted Domains
- Incentives in Teams
- Incomplete information and multiple machine queueing problems
- Mechanism design in queueing problems
- Pairwise strategy-proofness and self-enforcing manipulation
- Random Matching Under Dichotomous Preferences
- Strategyproof sharing of submodular costs: budget balance versus efficiency
- Strategyproofness, non-bossiness and group strategyproofness in a cost sharing model
Cited In (21)
- Egalitarian equivalence and strategyproofness in the queueing problem
- A characterization of the symmetrically balanced VCG rule in the queueing problem
- Switching queues, cultural conventions, and social welfare
- Strategy-proof and anonymous rule in queueing problems: a relationship between equity and efficiency
- Subgroup additivity in the queueing problem
- Balanced VCG mechanisms for sequencing problems
- No-envy, solidarity, and strategy-proofness in the queueing problem
- The on-line transfer rule for queueing with arrivals
- Generalized welfare lower bounds and strategyproofness in sequencing problems
- Characterizations of pivotal mechanisms in the queueing problem
- Egalitarianism in the queueing problem
- Weak group strategy-proof and queue-efficient mechanisms for the queueing problem with multiple machines
- Prior-free online mechanisms for queueing with arrivals
- Queueing games with an endogenous number of machines
- Incentives and justice for sequencing problems
- Collusion-proof mechanisms for multi-unit procurement
- Fair and group strategy-proof good allocation with money
- The Shapley value in positional queueing problems
- Reordering an existing queue
- Recent developments in the queueing problem
- Welfare lower bounds and strategy-proofness in the queueing problem
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