Group strategyproofness in queueing models
From MaRDI portal
Publication:536097
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2010.06.011zbMATH Open1236.90035OpenAlexW1995034472MaRDI QIDQ536097FDOQ536097
Authors: Manipushpak Mitra, Suresh Mutuswami 
Publication date: 16 May 2011
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://repository.essex.ac.uk/8901/1/dp610.pdf
Recommendations
- Weak group strategy-proof and queue-efficient mechanisms for the queueing problem with multiple machines
- Characterizations of pivotal mechanisms in the queueing problem
- Egalitarian equivalence and strategyproofness in the queueing problem
- Fair and group strategy-proof good allocation with money
- Group strategyproof cost sharing: the role of indifferences
Group preferences (91B10) Queues and service in operations research (90B22) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
Cites Work
- A characterization of the Shapley value in queueing problems
- Incentives in Teams
- Groves' Scheme on Restricted Domains
- Strategyproof sharing of submodular costs: budget balance versus efficiency
- Achieving the first best in sequencing problems.
- Mechanism design in queueing problems
- Random Matching Under Dichotomous Preferences
- Incomplete information and multiple machine queueing problems
- Strategyproofness, non-bossiness and group strategyproofness in a cost sharing model
- Pairwise strategy-proofness and self-enforcing manipulation
Cited In (21)
- Egalitarian equivalence and strategyproofness in the queueing problem
- A characterization of the symmetrically balanced VCG rule in the queueing problem
- Switching queues, cultural conventions, and social welfare
- Strategy-proof and anonymous rule in queueing problems: a relationship between equity and efficiency
- Subgroup additivity in the queueing problem
- Balanced VCG mechanisms for sequencing problems
- No-envy, solidarity, and strategy-proofness in the queueing problem
- The on-line transfer rule for queueing with arrivals
- Generalized welfare lower bounds and strategyproofness in sequencing problems
- Characterizations of pivotal mechanisms in the queueing problem
- Egalitarianism in the queueing problem
- Weak group strategy-proof and queue-efficient mechanisms for the queueing problem with multiple machines
- Prior-free online mechanisms for queueing with arrivals
- Queueing games with an endogenous number of machines
- Incentives and justice for sequencing problems
- Collusion-proof mechanisms for multi-unit procurement
- Fair and group strategy-proof good allocation with money
- The Shapley value in positional queueing problems
- Reordering an existing queue
- Recent developments in the queueing problem
- Welfare lower bounds and strategy-proofness in the queueing problem
This page was built for publication: Group strategyproofness in queueing models
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q536097)
