Group strategyproofness in queueing models

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2010.06.011zbMATH Open1236.90035OpenAlexW1995034472MaRDI QIDQ536097FDOQ536097

Authors Manipushpak Mitra, Suresh Mutuswami 

Publication date 16 May 2011

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://repository.essex.ac.uk/8901/1/dp610.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

efficiencyqueueing modelsgroup strategyproofnessno deficit

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Group preferences (91B10) Queues and service in operations research (90B22) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• Weak group strategy-proof and queue-efficient mechanisms for the queueing problem with multiple machines
• Characterizations of pivotal mechanisms in the queueing problem
• Egalitarian equivalence and strategyproofness in the queueing problem
• Fair and group strategy-proof good allocation with money
• Group strategyproof cost sharing: the role of indifferences

Cites Work

• A characterization of the Shapley value in queueing problems
• Achieving the first best in sequencing problems.
• Groves' Scheme on Restricted Domains
• Incentives in Teams
• Incomplete information and multiple machine queueing problems
• Mechanism design in queueing problems
• Pairwise strategy-proofness and self-enforcing manipulation
• Random Matching Under Dichotomous Preferences
• Strategyproof sharing of submodular costs: budget balance versus efficiency
• Strategyproofness, non-bossiness and group strategyproofness in a cost sharing model

Cited In (21)

• Egalitarian equivalence and strategyproofness in the queueing problem
• A characterization of the symmetrically balanced VCG rule in the queueing problem
• Switching queues, cultural conventions, and social welfare
• Strategy-proof and anonymous rule in queueing problems: a relationship between equity and efficiency
• Subgroup additivity in the queueing problem
• Balanced VCG mechanisms for sequencing problems
• No-envy, solidarity, and strategy-proofness in the queueing problem
• The on-line transfer rule for queueing with arrivals
• Generalized welfare lower bounds and strategyproofness in sequencing problems
• Characterizations of pivotal mechanisms in the queueing problem
• Egalitarianism in the queueing problem
• Weak group strategy-proof and queue-efficient mechanisms for the queueing problem with multiple machines
• Prior-free online mechanisms for queueing with arrivals
• Queueing games with an endogenous number of machines
• Incentives and justice for sequencing problems
• Collusion-proof mechanisms for multi-unit procurement
• Fair and group strategy-proof good allocation with money
• The Shapley value in positional queueing problems
• Reordering an existing queue
• Recent developments in the queueing problem
• Welfare lower bounds and strategy-proofness in the queueing problem

This page was built for publication: Group strategyproofness in queueing models

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q536097)