Characterizations of pivotal mechanisms in the queueing problem

DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2014.09.005zbMath1308.91064OpenAlexW1988709226MaRDI QIDQ477794

Manipushpak Mitra, Suresh Mutuswami, Youngsub Chun

Publication date: 9 December 2014

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2014.09.005

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Queues and service in operations research (90B22) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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Fairness in group identification ⋮ No-envy, solidarity, and strategy-proofness in the queueing problem ⋮ Recent developments in the queueing problem ⋮ Reordering an existing queue ⋮ Welfare lower bounds and strategy-proofness in the queueing problem ⋮ Prior-free online mechanisms for queueing with arrivals

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