Strategy-proof and anonymous rule in queueing problems: a relationship between equity and efficiency
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Publication:427528
DOI10.1007/S00355-011-0540-7zbMath1247.90102OpenAlexW2132304597MaRDI QIDQ427528
Hiroki Saitoh, Kazuhiko Hashimoto
Publication date: 13 June 2012
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/11094/14032
Related Items (11)
No-envy and egalitarian-equivalence under multi-object-demand for heterogeneous objects ⋮ Incentives and justice for sequencing problems ⋮ Recent developments in the queueing problem ⋮ Characterization of Vickrey auction with reserve price for multiple objects ⋮ Weak group strategy-proof and queue-efficient mechanisms for the queueing problem with multiple machines ⋮ Characterizing Vickrey allocation rule by anonymity ⋮ Characterizations of pivotal mechanisms in the queueing problem ⋮ Fair and group strategy-proof good allocation with money ⋮ Welfare lower bounds and strategy-proofness in the queueing problem ⋮ A characterization of the symmetrically balanced VCG rule in the queueing problem ⋮ Corrigendum to ``Characterizations of Pareto-efficient, fair, and strategy-proof allocation rules in queueing problems
Cites Work
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- Consistency and monotonicity in sequencing problems
- Group strategyproofness in queueing models
- Simple sequencing problems with interdependent costs
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- Incomplete information and multiple machine queueing problems
- A characterization of the Shapley value in queueing problems
- Achieving the first best in sequencing problems.
- Cost sharing in a job scheduling problem
- No-envy in queueing problems
- A pessimistic approach to the queueing problem
- Large Indivisibles: An Analysis with Respect to Price Equilibrium and Fairness
- Groves' Scheme on Restricted Domains
- Mechanism design in queueing problems
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