Fair and group strategy-proof good allocation with money
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Publication:2247952
Recommendations
- A general strategy proof fair allocation mechanism
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Cites work
- An equity characterization of second price auctions when preferences may not be quasilinear
- Characterizations of strategy-proof and fair mechanisms for allocating indivisible goods
- Characterizing Vickrey allocation rule by anonymity
- Coalitionally strategy-proof rules in allotment economies with homogeneous indivisible goods
- Egalitarian-equivalent Groves mechanisms in the allocation of heterogeneous objects
- Fair Groves mechanisms
- Group strategyproofness in queueing models
- Groves sealed bid auctions of heterogeneous objects with fair prices
- Groves' Scheme on Restricted Domains
- Incentives in Teams
- Individual versus group strategy-proofness: when do they coincide?
- Large Indivisibles: An Analysis with Respect to Price Equilibrium and Fairness
- No-Envy and Consistency in Economies with Indivisible Goods
- Pairwise strategy-proofness and self-enforcing manipulation
- Random Matching Under Dichotomous Preferences
- Strategy-proof and anonymous rule in queueing problems: a relationship between equity and efficiency
- Strategy-proof and efficient allocation of an indivisible good on finitely restricted preference domains
- Strategy-proof and nonbossy allocation of indivisible goods and money
- Strategy-Proof Exchange
- The fair allocation of an indivisible good when monetary compensations are possible
- The positive consequence of strategic manipulation in indivisible good allocation
Cited in
(19)- Fair Groves mechanisms
- Groupstrategyproofness of the egalitarian mechanism for constrained rationing problems
- A mechanism design approach to allocating central government funds among regional development agencies
- Collusion-proof and fair auctions
- No-envy and egalitarian-equivalence under multi-object-demand for heterogeneous objects
- Collusion-proof mechanisms for multi-unit procurement
- Bribeproof Mechanisms for Two-Values Domains
- Fairness and group-strategyproofness clash in assignment problems
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 679846 (Why is no real title available?)
- Spanning tree auctions: a complete characterization
- Welfare lower bounds and strategy-proofness in the queueing problem
- Group strategyproofness in queueing models
- The Algorithmic Structure of Group Strategyproof Budget-Balanced Cost-Sharing Mechanisms
- Strategy‐proof and group strategy‐proof stable mechanisms: An equivalence
- Characterization of Vickrey auction with reserve price for multiple objects
- Strategy-proof allocation of objects: a characterization result
- Characterization of \textit{maxmed} mechanisms for multiple objects
- Strategy-proof rules in object allocation problems with hard budget constraints and income effects
- Characterizing group strategy-proof rules in the object allocation problem with money
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