Fair and group strategy-proof good allocation with money
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Publication:2247952
DOI10.1007/s00355-013-0733-3zbMath1291.91145OpenAlexW2052058205MaRDI QIDQ2247952
Publication date: 30 June 2014
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-013-0733-3
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)
Related Items (7)
No-envy and egalitarian-equivalence under multi-object-demand for heterogeneous objects ⋮ Characterization of Vickrey auction with reserve price for multiple objects ⋮ Collusion-proof mechanisms for multi-unit procurement ⋮ Spanning tree auctions: a complete characterization ⋮ Welfare lower bounds and strategy-proofness in the queueing problem ⋮ Bribeproof Mechanisms for Two-Values Domains ⋮ Collusion-proof and fair auctions
Cites Work
- Characterizing Vickrey allocation rule by anonymity
- Strategy-proof and anonymous rule in queueing problems: a relationship between equity and efficiency
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- Group strategyproofness in queueing models
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- Strategy-proof and nonbossy allocation of indivisible goods and money
- An equity characterization of second price auctions when preferences may not be quasilinear
- Individual versus group strategy-proofness: when do they coincide?
- The fair allocation of an indivisible good when monetary compensations are possible
- Pairwise strategy-proofness and self-enforcing manipulation
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- Large Indivisibles: An Analysis with Respect to Price Equilibrium and Fairness
- No-Envy and Consistency in Economies with Indivisible Goods
- Incentives in Teams
- Groves' Scheme on Restricted Domains
- Strategy-Proof Exchange
- Random Matching Under Dichotomous Preferences
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