Bribeproof Mechanisms for Two-Values Domains
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Publication:2819466
DOI10.1007/978-3-662-53354-3_23zbMath1403.91179arXiv1512.04277OpenAlexW2294314374MaRDI QIDQ2819466
Paolo Penna, Matúš Mihalák, Peter Widmayer
Publication date: 29 September 2016
Published in: Algorithmic Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1512.04277
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