Multi-unit auctions: beyond Roberts

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2014.04.006zbMath1314.91118arXiv1004.1449OpenAlexW1966092900MaRDI QIDQ2253831

Noam Nisan, Shahar Dobzinski

Publication date: 13 February 2015

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1004.1449

zbMATH Keywords

incentive compatibilityincentive compatible mechanism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items

Monotonicity and revenue equivalence domains by monotonic transformations in differences ⋮ Characterizing incentive compatible, Pareto optimal and sufficiently anonymous constrained combinatorial mechanisms – Two players case ⋮ Separating the Communication Complexity of Truthful and Nontruthful Algorithms for Combinatorial Auctions ⋮ Walrasian pricing in multi-unit auctions ⋮ Roberts' theorem with neutrality: a social welfare ordering approach ⋮ A universally-truthful approximation scheme for multi-unit auctions ⋮ Separability and decomposition in mechanism design with transfers ⋮ Introduction to computer science and economic theory ⋮ No truthful mechanism can be better than \(n\) approximate for two natural problems ⋮ Towards characterizing the deterministic combinatorial constrained efficient space ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ On fair price discrimination in multi-unit markets ⋮ Bribeproof Mechanisms for Two-Values Domains ⋮ On social envy-freeness in multi-unit markets ⋮ Dictatorial Mechanisms in Constrained Combinatorial Auctions ⋮ Mechanism design with two alternatives in quasi-linear environments

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Roberts' theorem with neutrality: a social welfare ordering approach
• Ex-post implementation and preference aggregation via potentials
• Truthful germs are contagious: a local-to-global characterization of truthfulness
• Truthful implementation and preference aggregation in restricted domains
• The communication requirements of efficient allocations and supporting prices
• Monotonicity and Implementability
• Weak Monotonicity Characterizes Deterministic Dominant-Strategy Implementation
• Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods
• Groves' Scheme on Restricted Domains
• Algorithmic mechanism design