Separability and decomposition in mechanism design with transfers
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Publication:1753288
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2017.12.018zbMath1390.91134OpenAlexW2783828075MaRDI QIDQ1753288
Souvik Roy, Swaprava Nath, Debasis Mishra
Publication date: 29 May 2018
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.12.018
Public goods (91B18) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Social choice (91B14)
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Cites Work
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