Two simplified proofs for Roberts' theorem

DOI10.1007/S00355-008-0331-YzbMATH Open1187.91059OpenAlexW1972689981MaRDI QIDQ733788FDOQ733788

Authors: Ron Lavi, Ahuva Mu'alem, Noam Nisan 

Publication date: 19 October 2009

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-008-0331-y

Recommendations

• Roberts' theorem with neutrality: a social welfare ordering approach
• A modular approach to Roberts' theorem
• Robust implementation in general mechanisms
• Truthful implementation and preference aggregation in restricted domains
• Robust implementation in direct mechanisms

zbMATH Keywords

social welfaresocial choice

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

• Optimal Auction Design
• A necessary and sufficient condition for rationalizability in a quasilinear context
• Weak Monotonicity Characterizes Deterministic Dominant-Strategy Implementation
• Characterization of ex post equilibrium in the VCG combinatorial auctions

Cited In (16)

• Incentive compatibility and strategy-proofness of mechanisms of organizational behavior control: retrospective, state of the art, and prospects of theoretical research
• Roberts' theorem with neutrality: a social welfare ordering approach
• Algorithms and mechanisms for procuring services with uncertain durations using redundancy
• Strategy-proofness and weighted voting
• Separability and decomposition in mechanism design with transfers
• A modular approach to Roberts' theorem
• Mechanism design with two alternatives in quasi-linear environments
• Two-player incentive compatible outcome functions are affine maximizers
• No truthful mechanism can be better than \(n\) approximate for two natural problems
• Balanced implementability of sequencing rules
• Selling mechanisms for a financially constrained buyer
• Simple proof of two-well rigidity
• Truthful implementation and preference aggregation in restricted domains
• Roberts' weak welfarism theorem: a minor correction
• Dominant strategy implementation with a convex product space of valuations
• Dominant strategy implementability and zero length cycles

This page was built for publication: Two simplified proofs for Roberts' theorem

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q733788)