Two simplified proofs for Roberts' theorem

DOI10.1007/S00355-008-0331-YMaRDI QIDQ733788zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Ron Lavi, Ahuva Mu'alem, Noam Nisan

Publication date 19 October 2009

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-008-0331-y

zbMATH Keywords

social choicesocial welfare

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Review text

Roberts showed that every social choice function that is ex-post implementable in private value settings must maximize the weighted social welfare. To fully understand the techniques and intuitions behind Roberts' original proof, this paper provides two simplified alternative proofs. The first one uses the same underlying key-point, but significantly simplifies the technical construction around it, thus making the essence visible. The second one is a weaker version, with an additional requirement of ``player decisiveness. It relies on the cycle monotonicity characterization, and shows how to strengthen this characterization, for the case of unrestricted domains, to yield as a result weighted welfare maximization.

Recommendations

• Roberts' theorem with neutrality: a social welfare ordering approach
• A modular approach to Roberts' theorem
• Robust implementation in general mechanisms
• Truthful implementation and preference aggregation in restricted domains
• Robust implementation in direct mechanisms

Cites work

• A necessary and sufficient condition for rationalizability in a quasilinear context
• Characterization of ex post equilibrium in the VCG combinatorial auctions
• Optimal Auction Design
• Weak Monotonicity Characterizes Deterministic Dominant-Strategy Implementation

Cited in

(17)

• Separability and decomposition in mechanism design with transfers
• No truthful mechanism can be better than n approximate for two natural problems
• Incentive compatibility and strategy-proofness of mechanisms of organizational behavior control: retrospective, state of the art, and prospects of theoretical research
• Dominant strategy implementability and zero length cycles
• Selling mechanisms for a financially constrained buyer
• Balanced implementability of sequencing rules
• Two-player incentive compatible outcome functions are affine maximizers
• Mechanism design with two alternatives in quasi-linear environments
• Truthful implementation and preference aggregation in restricted domains
• Dominant strategy implementation with a convex product space of valuations
• Simple proof of two-well rigidity
• A modular approach to Roberts' theorem
• Roberts' theorem with neutrality: a social welfare ordering approach
• Algorithms and mechanisms for procuring services with uncertain durations using redundancy
• Roberts' weak welfarism theorem: a minor correction
• Parameterized voter relevance in facility location games with tree-shaped invitation graphs
• Strategy-proofness and weighted voting

This page was built for publication: Two simplified proofs for Roberts' theorem

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q733788)