Dominant strategy implementability and zero length cycles

DOI10.1007/S00199-020-01324-7MaRDI QIDQ2074053zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors John A. Weymark, Paul Edelman

Publication date 4 February 2022

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-020-01324-7

zbMATH Keywords

mechanism designrevenue equivalenceimplementation theoryRochet's theoremdominant strategy incentive compatibility

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Recommendations

• The Complexity of Eliminating Dominated Strategies
• Characterizing the top cycle via strategyproofness
• Dominant strategy implementation of stable rules
• Implementation in Dominant Strategies under Complete and Incomplete Information
• The computational complexity of iterated elimination of dominated strategies
• Unrestricted domain extensions of dominant strategy implementable allocation functions
• Integer Programming and Combinatorial Optimization
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• Weak Monotonicity Characterizes Deterministic Dominant-Strategy Implementation
• Dominant strategy implementation in multi-unit allocation problems

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1266748 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3804333 (Why is no real title available?)
• A necessary and sufficient condition for rationalizability in a quasilinear context
• An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation
• Bayesian and dominant-strategy implementation in the independent private-values model
• Characterization of Revenue Equivalence
• Characterizing implementable allocation rules in multi-dimensional environments
• Characterizing incentive compatibility for convex valuations
• Dominant strategy implementation with a convex product space of valuations
• Implementability under monotonic transformations in differences
• Incentive compatibility in non-quasilinear environments
• Mechanism design without quasilinearity
• Mechanism design. A linear programming approach.
• Monotonicity and implementability
• Multidimensional mechanism design in single peaked type spaces
• On the equivalence of Bayesian and dominant strategy implementation
• On the equivalence of Bayesian and dominant strategy implementation for environments with nonlinear utilities
• Optimal Auction Design
• Truthful germs are contagious: a local-to-global characterization of truthfulness
• Two simplified proofs for Roberts' theorem
• Unrestricted domain extensions of dominant strategy implementable allocation functions
• Weak Monotonicity Characterizes Deterministic Dominant-Strategy Implementation
• When is a monotone function cyclically monotone?

Cited in

(10)

• The Complexity of Eliminating Dominated Strategies
• The polyhedral geometry of truthful auctions
• Loops under Strategies
• Two-player incentive compatible outcome functions are affine maximizers
• On incentive compatible, individually rational public good provision mechanisms
• On the order of eliminating dominated strategies
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1897421 (Why is no real title available?)
• Unrestricted domain extensions of dominant strategy implementable allocation functions
• Characterization of Revenue Equivalence
• Dominant strategy implementation with a convex product space of valuations

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