Unrestricted domain extensions of dominant strategy implementable allocation functions

DOI10.1007/978-3-319-93809-7_16MaRDI QIDQ5111112zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors John A. Weymark, Paul Edelman

Publication date 26 May 2020

Published in Studies in Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-93809-7_16

zbMATH Keywords

allocation functiondominant strategy implementabilityrevenue equivalence property

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mechanism design theory (91B03) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Recommendations

• Dominant strategy implementability and zero length cycles
• Monotonicity and implementability
• Dominant strategy implementation in multi-unit allocation problems
• Truthful implementation and preference aggregation in restricted domains
• Implementation in multidimensional dichotomous domains

Cites work

• A necessary and sufficient condition for rationalizability in a quasilinear context
• Characterization of Revenue Equivalence
• Dominant strategy implementability and zero length cycles
• Dominant strategy implementation with a convex product space of valuations

Cited in

(1)

• Dominant strategy implementability and zero length cycles

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