Implementation in multidimensional dichotomous domains

DOI10.3982/TE1239MaRDI QIDQ4585980zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Debasis Mishra, Souvik Roy

Publication date 11 September 2018

Published in Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3982/te1239

zbMATH Keywords

cycle monotonicitydichotomous preferencesdominant strategy implementationgeneration monotonicity

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Utility theory (91B16)

Recommendations

• Multidimensional mechanism design in single peaked type spaces
• Weak Monotonicity Characterizes Deterministic Dominant-Strategy Implementation
• Monotonicity and implementability
• Monotonicity in mechanism design (abstract)
• Full implementation of social choice functions in dominant strategies

Cited in

(17)

• Dynamic communication mechanism design
• Balanced implementability of sequencing rules
• Matching with partners and projects
• Characterizing implementable allocation rules in multi-dimensional environments
• Incentive compatibility in non-quasilinear environments
• Truthful implementation and preference aggregation in restricted domains
• Dynamic slot allocations with different patience levels
• Menu mechanisms
• Characterization of truthful mechanisms for one-dimensional single facility location game with payments
• Monotonicity and implementability
• Monotonicity in mechanism design (abstract)
• Multidimensional mechanism design in single peaked type spaces
• Roberts' theorem with neutrality: a social welfare ordering approach
• The implementation duality
• Unrestricted domain extensions of dominant strategy implementable allocation functions
• Local incentive compatibility with transfers
• Characterizing implementability via weak monotonicity on unit demand valuation domains

This page was built for publication: Implementation in multidimensional dichotomous domains

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q4585980)