Implementation in multidimensional dichotomous domains
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Publication:4585980
DOI10.3982/TE1239zbMATH Open1395.91186OpenAlexW1585677292MaRDI QIDQ4585980FDOQ4585980
Authors: Debasis Mishra, Souvik Roy
Publication date: 11 September 2018
Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/te1239
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- Multidimensional mechanism design in single peaked type spaces
- Incentive compatibility in non-quasilinear environments
- Roberts' theorem with neutrality: a social welfare ordering approach
- Local incentive compatibility with transfers
- Dynamic slot allocations with different patience levels
- Monotonicity and implementability
- Balanced implementability of sequencing rules
- Menu mechanisms
- Truthful implementation and preference aggregation in restricted domains
- Unrestricted domain extensions of dominant strategy implementable allocation functions
- Matching with partners and projects
- Characterizing implementable allocation rules in multi-dimensional environments
- Dynamic communication mechanism design
- Monotonicity in mechanism design (abstract)
- The implementation duality
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