Local incentive compatibility with transfers
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Publication:516980
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2016.09.009zbMath1394.91172OpenAlexW2181756129MaRDI QIDQ516980
Souvik Roy, Anup Pramanik, Debasis Mishra
Publication date: 16 March 2017
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.09.009
local incentive compatibilityordinal type spacepayment-only incentive compatibilitysingle peaked type space
Related Items
Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibility in restricted domains, Characterizing implementable allocation rules in multi-dimensional environments
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