Truthful germs are contagious: a local-to-global characterization of truthfulness

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2014.01.004zbMath1296.91097MaRDI QIDQ2016243

Aaron Archer, Robert D. Kleinberg

Publication date: 19 June 2014

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2014.01.004

zbMATH Keywords

orthogonal polynomials; first-order logic; incentive compatibility; weak monotonicity; implementation theory; cyclic monotonicity; Stokes's theorem; multi-dimensional types; local-to-global characterization; Rochet's theorem; Saks-Yu theorem; truthful mechanism design; truthful stitching; vortex-freeness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models

91B14: Social choice

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