Truthful germs are contagious: a local-to-global characterization of truthfulness

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2014.01.004zbMATH Open1296.91097OpenAlexW2057857467MaRDI QIDQ2016243FDOQ2016243

Aaron Archer, Robert D. Kleinberg

Publication date: 19 June 2014

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2014.01.004

zbMATH Keywords

first-order logicorthogonal polynomialsincentive compatibilityweak monotonicityimplementation theorycyclic monotonicityStokes's theoremmulti-dimensional typeslocal-to-global characterizationRochet's theoremSaks-Yu theoremtruthful mechanism designtruthful stitchingvortex-freeness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

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• Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations
• Optimal Auction Design
• Incentives in Teams
• A necessary and sufficient condition for rationalizability in a quasilinear context
• Multidimensional incentive compatibility and mechanism design
• An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation
• Weak Monotonicity Characterizes Deterministic Dominant-Strategy Implementation
• Multidimensional mechanism design for auctions with externalities
• Weak monotonicity and Bayes-Nash incentive compatibility
• Monotonicity and Implementability

Cited In (20)

• Local incentive compatibility on gross substitutes and other non-convex type-spaces
• Implementability under monotonic transformations in differences
• Multidimensional mechanism design in single peaked type spaces
• The polyhedral geometry of truthful auctions
• Roberts' theorem with neutrality: a social welfare ordering approach
• Implementability with contingent contracts
• Local incentive compatibility with transfers
• A lower bound of \(1+\varphi \) for truthful scheduling mechanisms
• Characterization of Truthful Mechanisms for One-Dimensional Single Facility Location Game with Payments
• TESTING THE QUANTAL RESPONSE HYPOTHESIS
• Multi-unit auctions: beyond Roberts
• Selling mechanisms for a financially constrained buyer
• Truthful implementation and preference aggregation in restricted domains
• Strategyproof facility location in perturbation stable instances
• Efficient implementation with interdependent valuations and maxmin agents
• Characterizing implementable allocation rules in multi-dimensional environments
• Monotonicity and revenue equivalence domains by monotonic transformations in differences
• Dominant strategy implementation with a convex product space of valuations
• Truthful mechanisms with implicit payment computation
• Dominant strategy implementability and zero length cycles

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