Truthful germs are contagious: a local-to-global characterization of truthfulness

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2014.01.004MaRDI QIDQ2016243zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Aaron Archer, Robert D. Kleinberg

Publication date 19 June 2014

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2014.01.004

zbMATH Keywords

cyclic monotonicityfirst-order logicimplementation theoryincentive compatibilitylocal-to-global characterizationmulti-dimensional typesorthogonal polynomialsRochet's theoremSaks-Yu theoremStokes's theoremtruthful mechanism designtruthful stitchingvortex-freenessweak monotonicity

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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Cites work

• A necessary and sufficient condition for rationalizability in a quasilinear context
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• Incentives in Teams
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• Monotonicity and implementability
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Cited in

(23)

• Efficient implementation with interdependent valuations and maxmin agents
• A lower bound of \(1+\varphi \) for truthful scheduling mechanisms
• Dominant strategy implementability and zero length cycles
• Strategyproof facility location in perturbation stable instances
• Selling mechanisms for a financially constrained buyer
• Multi-unit auctions: beyond Roberts
• Implementability with contingent contracts
• Monotonicity and revenue equivalence domains by monotonic transformations in differences
• Characterizing implementable allocation rules in multi-dimensional environments
• Truthful implementation and preference aggregation in restricted domains
• Dominant strategy implementation with a convex product space of valuations
• Truthful mechanisms with implicit payment computation
• Characterization of truthful mechanisms for one-dimensional single facility location game with payments
• Multidimensional mechanism design in single peaked type spaces
• Roberts' theorem with neutrality: a social welfare ordering approach
• Local incentive compatibility with transfers
• Testing the quantal response hypothesis
• The polyhedral geometry of truthful auctions
• Local incentive compatibility on gross substitutes and other non-convex type-spaces
• On the Nisan-Ronen conjecture for submodular valuations
• Intertemporal allocation with unknown discounting
• The polyhedral geometry of truthful auctions
• Implementability under monotonic transformations in differences

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