Alternatives to Truthfulness Are Hard to Recognize

DOI10.1007/978-3-540-79309-0_18MaRDI QIDQ5459984zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Paolo Penna, Giuseppe Persiano, Carmine Ventre, V. Auletta

Publication date 2 May 2008

Published in Algorithmic Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-79309-0_18

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

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Cites work

• A necessary and sufficient condition for rationalizability in a quasilinear context
• Implementation with partial verification
• Partially Verifiable Information and Mechanism Design

Cited in

(9)

• Truth-telling reservations
• Truthfulness flooded domains and the power of verification for mechanism design
• False modesty: when disclosing good news looks bad
• Truthful germs are contagious: a local-to-global characterization of truthfulness
• Perfect implementation
• Better with Byzantine: manipulation-optimal mechanisms
• Words or deeds? Choosing what to know about others
• Preferences for Truth‐Telling
• A must lie situation -- avoiding giving negative feedback

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