Truthfulness flooded domains and the power of verification for mechanism design

DOI10.1007/978-3-642-45046-4_17MaRDI QIDQ2937758zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Dimitris Fotakis, Emmanouil Zampetakis

Publication date 12 January 2015

Published in Web and Internet Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-45046-4_17

zbMATH Keywords

mechanism designsocial choice functionsymmetric verificationtruthfulness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Social choice (91B14)

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• Mechanism design for the truthful elicitation of costly probabilistic estimates in distributed information systems
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• Endogenous verifiability and optimality in agency

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