scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2200715

zbMATH Open1068.91529MaRDI QIDQ5312468FDOQ5312468

Dmitriĭ Aleksandrovich Novikov, Vladimir N. Burkov, S. N. Petrakov

Publication date: 1 September 2005

Title of this publication is not available (Why is that?)

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Cited In (3)

• On the generic impossibility of truthful behavior: A simple approach
• Mechanism Design with Set-Theoretic Beliefs
• Mechanism design with renegotiation and costly messages

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