scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2200715
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Publication:5312468
zbMATH Open1068.91529MaRDI QIDQ5312468FDOQ5312468
Dmitriĭ Aleksandrovich Novikov, Vladimir N. Burkov, S. N. Petrakov
Publication date: 1 September 2005
Title of this publication is not available (Why is that?)
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- Mechanism design with side payments: individual rationality and iterative dominance
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