scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2200715

zbMATH Open1068.91529MaRDI QIDQ5312468FDOQ5312468

Authors: Vladimir N. Burkov, Dmitriĭ Aleksandrovich Novikov, S. N. Petrakov 

Publication date: 1 September 2005

Title of this publication is not available (Why is that?)

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Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Cited In (7)

• Dominance of truthtelling and the lattice structure of Nash equilibria
• Communication in economic mechanisms
• On the generic impossibility of truthful behavior: A simple approach
• Mechanism Design with Set-Theoretic Beliefs
• Dominant strategy mechanisms with mutually payoff-relevant private information and with public information
• Mechanism design with renegotiation and costly messages
• Mechanism design with side payments: individual rationality and iterative dominance

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