On the generic impossibility of truthful behavior: A simple approach

DOI10.1007/BF01212497zbMath0831.90006OpenAlexW1547538471MaRDI QIDQ1896689

Carmen Beviá, Luis C. Corchon

Publication date: 4 September 1995

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01212497

zbMATH Keywords

strategy-proofefficient and individually rational mechanism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (6)

A general impossibility theorem and its application to individual rights ⋮ A Hurwicz type result in a model with public good production ⋮ Implementation Theory ⋮ Almost-dominant strategy implementation: exchange economies ⋮ Differentiable strategy-proof mechanisms for private and public goods in domains that are not necessarily large or quasi-linear ⋮ Simple strategy-proof approximately Walrasian mechanisms

Cites Work

• Inefficiency of strategy-proof allocation mechanisms in pure exchange economies
• Incentive compatibility and individual rationality in public good economies
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• On the Generic Nonoptimality of Dominant-Strategy Allocation Mechanisms: A General Theorem That Includes Pure Exchange Economies
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Impossibility of Strategy-Proof Mechanisms in Economies with Pure Public Goods
• Unnamed Item

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