On the Generic Nonoptimality of Dominant-Strategy Allocation Mechanisms: A General Theorem That Includes Pure Exchange Economies

DOI10.2307/2938196zbMath0728.90027OpenAlexW2081127991MaRDI QIDQ3352808

Publication date: 1990

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2938196

zbMATH Keywords

decomposability impossibility theorems dominant strategies continuous truth-dominant allocation mechanism dominant- strategy equilibria nonoptimal allocations

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Public goods (91B18) General equilibrium theory (91B50) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Social choice (91B14)

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