Are we there yet? Mechanism design beyond equilibrium
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Publication:5111108
DOI10.1007/978-3-319-93809-7_12zbMATH Open1443.91098OpenAlexW2947996795MaRDI QIDQ5111108FDOQ5111108
Authors:
Publication date: 26 May 2020
Published in: Studies in Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-93809-7_12
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Cites Work
- On the Generic Nonoptimality of Dominant-Strategy Allocation Mechanisms: A General Theorem That Includes Pure Exchange Economies
- Price-Quantity Strategic Market Games
- A Simple Incentive Compatible Scheme for Attaining Lindahl Allocations
- Outcome Functions Yielding Walrasian and Lindahl Allocations at Nash Equilibrium Points
- A family of supermodular Nash mechanisms implementing Lindahl allocations
- Out-of-equilibrium performance of three Lindahl mechanisms: experimental evidence
- A stable Nash mechanism implementing Lindahl allocations for quasi-linear environments
- A simple market-like allocation mechanism for public goods
Cited In (3)
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