Are we there yet? Mechanism design beyond equilibrium

DOI10.1007/978-3-319-93809-7_12MaRDI QIDQ5111108zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors

Publication date 26 May 2020

Published in Studies in Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-93809-7_12

zbMATH Keywords

equilibriummechanism designpublic-goods problemWalrasian exchange model

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Public goods (91B18) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

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Cites work

• A Simple Incentive Compatible Scheme for Attaining Lindahl Allocations
• A family of supermodular Nash mechanisms implementing Lindahl allocations
• A simple market-like allocation mechanism for public goods
• A stable Nash mechanism implementing Lindahl allocations for quasi-linear environments
• On the Generic Nonoptimality of Dominant-Strategy Allocation Mechanisms: A General Theorem That Includes Pure Exchange Economies
• Out-of-equilibrium performance of three Lindahl mechanisms: experimental evidence
• Outcome Functions Yielding Walrasian and Lindahl Allocations at Nash Equilibrium Points
• Price-Quantity Strategic Market Games

Cited in

(5)

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1842061 (Why is no real title available?)
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• Learning dynamics for mechanism design: an experimental comparison of public goods mechanisms
• Irresolute mechanism design: a new path to possibility
• Mechanism design for pandemics

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