Irresolute mechanism design: a new path to possibility
From MaRDI portal
Publication:6183347
Recommendations
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1842061
- A new approach to auctions and resilient mechanism design
- Are we there yet? Mechanism design beyond equilibrium
- On the Futility of Dynamics in Robust Mechanism Design
- Foundations of mechanism design: a tutorial. II. Advanced concepts and results
- Mechanism design with uncertain inputs, (to err is human, to forgive divine)
- Mechanism design with possibilistic beliefs
- Mechanism design without quasilinearity
Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3137856 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3898540 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 44383 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 49749 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 52527 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 53233 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2038875 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3215724 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3361657 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3402334 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3400720 (Why is no real title available?)
- A course in game theory.
- A crash course in implementation theory
- Basic Geometry of Voting
- Condorcet Social Choice Functions
- Consistent Voting Systems
- Dictatorial domains
- Effectivity Functions and Acceptable Game Forms
- Equilibrium points in n -person games
- Existence and Uniqueness of Maximal Reductions Under Iterated Strict Dominance
- Implementation in mixed Nash equilibrium
- Manipulation of Schemes that Mix Voting with Chance
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Manipulation of social choice functions
- Manipulation of social decision functions
- Multi-valued strategy-proof social choice rules
- Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
- Nash Implementation Using Undominated Strategies
- Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization
- Nash implementation with partially honest individuals
- Non-cooperative games
- On Nicely Consistent Voting Systems
- On strategy-proof social choice correspondences
- On the necessary and sufficient conditions for Nash implementation
- Rationalizable Strategic Behavior
- Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
- Strategic manipulability without resoluteness or shared beliefs: Gibbard-Satterthwaite generalized
- Strategy-Proofness and Social Choice Functions without Singlevaluedness
- Strategy-proof social choice correspondences.
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- Subgame Perfect Implementation
- Subgame perfect implementation: A necessary and almost sufficient condition
- Subgame perfect implementation: a full characterization
- The Theory of Implementation of Social Choice Rules
- The equivalence of strong positive association and strategy-proofness
- Time and Nash implementation
- Virtual Implementation in Nash Equilibrium
This page was built for publication: Irresolute mechanism design: a new path to possibility
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q6183347)
