Irresolute mechanism design: a new path to possibility
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Publication:6183347
DOI10.1007/s00182-023-00849-0zbMath1530.91128MaRDI QIDQ6183347
Publication date: 4 January 2024
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Nash equilibriumsocial choice theoryimplementationimpossibility resultscollective decision makingCondorcet rule
Cites Work
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