Irresolute mechanism design: a new path to possibility
From MaRDI portal
Publication:6183347
DOI10.1007/S00182-023-00849-0zbMATH Open1530.91128MaRDI QIDQ6183347FDOQ6183347
Authors: Ville Korpela 
Publication date: 4 January 2024
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Recommendations
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1842061
- A new approach to auctions and resilient mechanism design
- Are we there yet? Mechanism design beyond equilibrium
- On the Futility of Dynamics in Robust Mechanism Design
- Foundations of mechanism design: a tutorial. II. Advanced concepts and results
- Mechanism design with uncertain inputs, (to err is human, to forgive divine)
- Mechanism design with possibilistic beliefs
- Mechanism design without quasilinearity
Nash equilibriumimplementationsocial choice theoryimpossibility resultscollective decision makingCondorcet rule
Cites Work
- Non-cooperative games
- Equilibrium points in n -person games
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- A course in game theory.
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Condorcet Social Choice Functions
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Basic Geometry of Voting
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- On strategy-proof social choice correspondences
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- Manipulation of social choice functions
- Strategic manipulability without resoluteness or shared beliefs: Gibbard-Satterthwaite generalized
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Strategy-Proofness and Social Choice Functions without Singlevaluedness
- Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
- A crash course in implementation theory
- Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
- Rationalizable Strategic Behavior
- The Theory of Implementation of Social Choice Rules
- Existence and Uniqueness of Maximal Reductions Under Iterated Strict Dominance
- Implementation in mixed Nash equilibrium
- Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization
- Subgame Perfect Implementation
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Nash implementation with partially honest individuals
- Subgame perfect implementation: A necessary and almost sufficient condition
- The equivalence of strong positive association and strategy-proofness
- Subgame perfect implementation: a full characterization
- Virtual Implementation in Nash Equilibrium
- Manipulation of Schemes that Mix Voting with Chance
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- On the necessary and sufficient conditions for Nash implementation
- Manipulation of social decision functions
- Strategy-proof social choice correspondences.
- Multi-valued strategy-proof social choice rules
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Dictatorial domains
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Nash Implementation Using Undominated Strategies
- Consistent Voting Systems
- On Nicely Consistent Voting Systems
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Effectivity Functions and Acceptable Game Forms
- Time and Nash implementation
Cited In (1)
This page was built for publication: Irresolute mechanism design: a new path to possibility
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q6183347)
