Multi-valued strategy-proof social choice rules
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Publication:2567932
DOI10.1007/s003550100134zbMath1072.91543OpenAlexW1964099159MaRDI QIDQ2567932
Publication date: 14 October 2005
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550100134
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