Multi-valued strategy-proof social choice rules

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Publication:2567932

DOI10.1007/s003550100134zbMath1072.91543OpenAlexW1964099159MaRDI QIDQ2567932

Lin Zhou, Stephen Ching

Publication date: 14 October 2005

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550100134




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