A trade-off result for preference revelation

DOI10.1016/S0304-4068(99)00037-3zbMATH Open0964.91012OpenAlexW2094678959MaRDI QIDQ1576476FDOQ1576476

Authors: Donald E. Campbell, Jerry S. Kelly 

Publication date: 14 August 2000

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0304-4068(99)00037-3

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zbMATH Keywords

trade-offGibbard-Satterthwaite theoremsocial choice function

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• Game forms, rights, and the efficiency of social outcomes
• Strategic manipulability without resoluteness or shared beliefs: Gibbard-Satterthwaite generalized
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• General Possibility Theorems for Group Decisions
• Multi-valued strategy-proof social choice rules

Cited In (4)

• Coalitionally strategy-proof social choice correspondences and the Pareto rule
• On the manipulation of social choice correspondences
• Social choice trade-off results for conditions on triples of alternatives
• Candidate stability and voting correspondences

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