Game forms, rights, and the efficiency of social outcomes

DOI10.1006/JETH.1996.2201zbMATH Open0883.90006OpenAlexW1979596441MaRDI QIDQ1363525FDOQ1363525

Authors: Prasanta K. Pattanaik, Laura Razzolini, R. Deb 

Publication date: 10 August 1997

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1996.2201

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zbMATH Keywords

game formSen's familiar paradox of the Paretian liberal

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

Cited In (21)

• Rights as alternative game forms
• A liberal paradox for judgment aggregation
• A paradox of expert rights in abstract argumentation
• Individual powers and social consent: an axiomatic approach
• Effectivity Functions and Acceptable Game Forms
• Separable discrete functions: recognition and sufficient conditions
• Consistent rights on property spaces
• A general impossibility theorem and its application to individual rights
• Pareto efficiency with spatial rights
• Daunou's voting rule and the lexicographic assignment of priorities
• An axiomatic approach to predictability of outcomes in an interactive setting
• Freedom of choice in a social context: comparing game forms
• A trade-off result for preference revelation
• Representation of effectivity functions by acceptable game forms: a complete characterization
• Between liberalism and democracy.
• The representation of alienable and inalienable rights: Games in transition function form
• On rights in game forms
• On the strategic inconsistency of the meta-rights approach
• Nash consistent representation of constitutions: A reaction to the Gibbard paradox.
• On the meta-strategic inconsistency of a Paretian liberal
• Liberalism, efficiency, and stability: Some possibility results

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