Individual powers and social consent: an axiomatic approach
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Publication:964820
DOI10.1007/s00355-009-0418-0zbMath1202.91078OpenAlexW2081821327MaRDI QIDQ964820
Publication date: 21 April 2010
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-009-0418-0
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- Game forms, rights, and the efficiency of social outcomes
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- On the axiomatic method and its recent applications to game theory and resource allocation
- A characterization of strategy-proof voting rules for separable weak orderings
- Liberal Values and Independence
- Formal Structure of Majority Decision
- A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision
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