Community standards
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Publication:2434242
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2013.09.008zbMath1284.91142OpenAlexW4249961687WikidataQ58639731 ScholiaQ58639731MaRDI QIDQ2434242
Publication date: 5 February 2014
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2013.09.008
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