Rules for aggregating information

DOI10.1007/s00355-010-0466-5zbMath1232.91442OpenAlexW2032148809WikidataQ58639758 ScholiaQ58639758MaRDI QIDQ622567

Alan D. Miller, Christopher P. Chambers

Publication date: 3 February 2011

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-010-0466-5

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economics of information (91B44)

Related Items

A theorem on aggregating classifications, Strategy-proof partitioning, Scholarly influence, Aggregation and residuation, Community standards, Separability and aggregation of equivalence relations, Information and size of coalitions, Liberalism and dictatorship in the problem of fuzzy classification, Aggregation on a finite lattice, NON-MANIPULABLE PARTITIONING, Some Observations on Oligarchies, Internal Direct Sums, and Lattice Congruences

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