Between liberalism and democracy.
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Publication:1399552
DOI10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00080-2zbMATH Open1042.91020MaRDI QIDQ1399552FDOQ1399552
Publication date: 30 July 2003
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
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Cites Work
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- Algebraic aggregation theory
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- A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision
- Game forms, rights, and the efficiency of social outcomes
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Voting by Committees
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- Self-designation and group allocation
- Alternative axioms in group identification problems
- Group identification
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- Collective Choice for Simple Preferences
- How to identify experts in a community?
- Dilemma with approval and disapproval votes
- Collective identity functions with status quo
- Fairness in group identification
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- A theorem on aggregating classifications
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- Power set extensions of dichotomous preferences
- Community standards
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- Symmetry and impartial lotteries
- Strategic nomination and non-manipulable voting procedures
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- Simple collective identity functions
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- Qualified voting systems
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- Procedural group identification
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