The possibility of Arrovian social choice with the process of nomination
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Publication:2404218
DOI10.1007/s11238-016-9547-yzbMath1378.91078OpenAlexW2344071658MaRDI QIDQ2404218
Publication date: 18 September 2017
Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-016-9547-y
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