Independent social choice correspondences are dictatorial
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Publication:373789
DOI10.1016/0165-1765(85)90092-8zbMATH Open1273.91147OpenAlexW2042555945MaRDI QIDQ373789FDOQ373789
Authors: Vincenzo Denicolò
Publication date: 25 October 2013
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(85)90092-8
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Cites Work
Cited In (11)
- A characterization of dictatorial social choice correspondences with continuous preferences
- Collective choice rules with social maximality
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Social choice rules implemented in dominant strategies
- A foundation for Pareto optimality
- Some further results on nonbinary social choice
- Public goods and Arrovian social choice
- Independent social choice correspondences
- New results in the theory of multivalued mappings. I: Topological characteristics and solvability of operator relations
- The possibility of Arrovian social choice with the process of nomination
- Title not available (Why is that?)
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