Independent social choice correspondences are dictatorial

DOI10.1016/0165-1765(85)90092-8MaRDI QIDQ373789zbMATHOpenAlexFDO

Authors Vincenzo Denicolò

Publication date 25 October 2013

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(85)90092-8

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Voting theory (91B12)

Recommendations

• Independent social choice correspondences
• A characterization of dictatorial social choice correspondences with continuous preferences
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2202054
• Social choice correspondences with infinitely many agents: serial dictatorship
• Arrovian Social Choice Correspondences
• Existence of a dictatorial subgroup in social choice with independent subgroup utility scales, an alternative proof
• A note on randomized social choice and random dictatorships
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4025107
• Social choice without the Pareto principle under weak independence
• Non-dictatorial extensive social choice

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3724161 (Why is no real title available?)
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• The equivalence of strong positive association and strategy-proofness

Cited in

(11)

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7431114 (Why is no real title available?)
• Independent social choice correspondences
• New results in the theory of multivalued mappings. I: Topological characteristics and solvability of operator relations
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2202054 (Why is no real title available?)
• Some further results on nonbinary social choice
• The possibility of Arrovian social choice with the process of nomination
• A characterization of dictatorial social choice correspondences with continuous preferences
• Public goods and Arrovian social choice
• Collective choice rules with social maximality
• A foundation for Pareto optimality
• Social choice rules implemented in dominant strategies

This page was built for publication: Independent social choice correspondences are dictatorial

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q373789)