Arrovian Social Choice Correspondences

DOI10.2307/2527312MaRDI QIDQ4331908zbMATHOpenAlexFDO

Authors Donald E. Campbell, Jerry S. Kelly

Publication date 13 February 1997

Published in International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.2307/2527312

zbMATH Keywords

social choice correspondenceagenda domain assumptionArrow's choice axiom

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

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Cited in

(12)

• Independent social choice correspondences
• Arrovian social choice with psychological thresholds
• The possibility of Arrovian social choice with the process of nomination
• Restricted domains, Arrow social welfare functions and noncorruptible and nonmanipulable social choice correspondences: The case of private and public alternatives
• Independent social choice correspondences are dictatorial
• Relaxing IIA and the effect on individual power
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4116251 (Why is no real title available?)
• Continuous-valued social choice
• Characterization of the Pareto social choice correspondence
• On two new social choice correspondences.
• Constitutional implementation of social choice correspondences
• Generic impossibility of Arrow's impossibility theorem

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