Arrovian Social Choice Correspondences

DOI10.2307/2527312MaRDI QIDQ4331908zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Donald E. Campbell, Jerry S. Kelly

Publication date 13 February 1997

Published in International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.2307/2527312

zbMATH Keywords

social choice correspondenceagenda domain assumptionArrow's choice axiom

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

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Cited in

(12)

• Continuous-valued social choice
• Generic impossibility of Arrow's impossibility theorem
• Arrovian social choice with psychological thresholds
• Characterization of the Pareto social choice correspondence
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4116251 (Why is no real title available?)
• Independent social choice correspondences
• On two new social choice correspondences.
• Restricted domains, Arrow social welfare functions and noncorruptible and nonmanipulable social choice correspondences: The case of private and public alternatives
• The possibility of Arrovian social choice with the process of nomination
• Relaxing IIA and the effect on individual power
• Independent social choice correspondences are dictatorial
• Constitutional implementation of social choice correspondences

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