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Cited in
(12)- Continuous-valued social choice
- Generic impossibility of Arrow's impossibility theorem
- Arrovian social choice with psychological thresholds
- Characterization of the Pareto social choice correspondence
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4116251 (Why is no real title available?)
- Independent social choice correspondences
- On two new social choice correspondences.
- Restricted domains, Arrow social welfare functions and noncorruptible and nonmanipulable social choice correspondences: The case of private and public alternatives
- The possibility of Arrovian social choice with the process of nomination
- Relaxing IIA and the effect on individual power
- Independent social choice correspondences are dictatorial
- Constitutional implementation of social choice correspondences
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