Arrovian Social Choice Correspondences

DOI10.2307/2527312zbMATH Open0867.90006OpenAlexW2044513249MaRDI QIDQ4331908FDOQ4331908

Jerry S. Kelly, Donald E. Campbell

Publication date: 13 February 1997

Published in: International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2527312

zbMATH Keywords

social choice correspondenceagenda domain assumptionArrow's choice axiom

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Cited In (9)

• Arrovian social choice with psychological thresholds
• Characterization of the Pareto social choice correspondence
• Independent social choice correspondences
• On two new social choice correspondences.
• Relaxing IIA and the effect on individual power
• Independent social choice correspondences are dictatorial
• Constitutional implementation of social choice correspondences
• Continuous-valued social choice
• Generic impossibility of Arrow's impossibility theorem

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