Restricted domains, Arrow social welfare functions and noncorruptible and nonmanipulable social choice correspondences: The case of private and public alternatives
DOI10.1016/0022-0531(85)90058-4zbMATH Open0553.90012OpenAlexW4240028409MaRDI QIDQ759609FDOQ759609
Publication date: 1985
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(85)90058-4
Recommendations
social choicerestricted domainsnondictorial Arrow-type social welfare functionnonmanipulable and noncorruptible social choice correspondence
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- Restricted domains, Arrow-social welfare functions and noncorruptible and nonmanipulable social choice correspondences: The case of private alternatives
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Cited In (6)
- Restricted domains, Arrow-social welfare functions and noncorruptible and nonmanipulable social choice correspondences: The case of private alternatives
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Strategic requirements with indifference: single-peaked versus single-plateaued preferences
- Arrovian theorems for economic domains. The case where there are simultaneously private and public goods
- Strategy-proof location of public bads in a two-country model
- Maximal Domains for Maskin Monotone Pareto Optimal and Anonymous Choice Rules
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