Restricted domains, Arrow social welfare functions and noncorruptible and nonmanipulable social choice correspondences: The case of private and public alternatives

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(85)90058-4MaRDI QIDQ759609zbMATHOpenAlexFDO

Authors Zvi Ritz

Publication date 1985

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(85)90058-4

zbMATH Keywords

social choicerestricted domainsnondictorial Arrow-type social welfare functionnonmanipulable and noncorruptible social choice correspondence

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

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Cites work

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• A condition for Nash-stability under binary and democratic group decision functions
• Characterization of domains admitting nondictatorial social welfare functions and nonmanipulable voting procedures
• Characterization of the private alternatives domains admitting Arrow social welfare functions
• Collective rationality and strategy-proofness of group decision rules
• Existence of stable situations, restricted preferences, and strategic manipulation under democratic group decision rules
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Restricted domains, Arrow-social welfare functions and noncorruptible and nonmanipulable social choice correspondences: The case of private alternatives
• Social choice and individual values
• Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms at Differentiable Points
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• The Existence of Social Welfare Functions

Cited in

(6)

• Restricted domains, Arrow-social welfare functions and noncorruptible and nonmanipulable social choice correspondences: The case of private alternatives
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2190132 (Why is no real title available?)
• Maximal domains for maskin monotone Pareto optimal and anonymous choice rules
• Strategy-proof location of public bads in a two-country model
• Strategic requirements with indifference: single-peaked versus single-plateaued preferences
• Arrovian theorems for economic domains. The case where there are simultaneously private and public goods

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