Collective rationality and strategy-proofness of group decision rules
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3137856 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3155240 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3361657 (Why is no real title available?)
- Exceptional Paper—Lexicographic Orders, Utilities and Decision Rules: A Survey
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Non-cooperative games
- Social choice and individual values
- Stability in Voting
- Threats, Counter-Threats, and Strategic Voting
Cited in
(8)- Manipulation of social decision functions
- Restricted domains, Arrow-social welfare functions and noncorruptible and nonmanipulable social choice correspondences: The case of private alternatives
- Special domains and nonmanipulability
- Characterization of domains admitting nondictatorial social welfare functions and nonmanipulable voting procedures
- Restricted domains, Arrow social welfare functions and noncorruptible and nonmanipulable social choice correspondences: The case of private and public alternatives
- Restricted preferences and strategyproofness of singlevalued social decision functions
- Existence of stable situations, restricted preferences, and strategic manipulation under democratic group decision rules
- A condition for Nash-stability under binary and democratic group decision functions
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