Collective rationality and strategy-proofness of group decision rules

DOI10.1007/BF02334315zbMATH Open0378.90007MaRDI QIDQ1247091FDOQ1247091

Authors: Prasanta K. Pattanaik 

Publication date: 1976

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06)

Cites Work

• Social choice and individual values
• Non-cooperative games
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Exceptional Paper—Lexicographic Orders, Utilities and Decision Rules: A Survey
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Stability in Voting
• Threats, Counter-Threats, and Strategic Voting

Cited In (8)

• Manipulation of social decision functions
• Restricted domains, Arrow-social welfare functions and noncorruptible and nonmanipulable social choice correspondences: The case of private alternatives
• Special domains and nonmanipulability
• Characterization of domains admitting nondictatorial social welfare functions and nonmanipulable voting procedures
• Restricted domains, Arrow social welfare functions and noncorruptible and nonmanipulable social choice correspondences: The case of private and public alternatives
• Restricted preferences and strategyproofness of singlevalued social decision functions
• Existence of stable situations, restricted preferences, and strategic manipulation under democratic group decision rules
• A condition for Nash-stability under binary and democratic group decision functions

This page was built for publication: Collective rationality and strategy-proofness of group decision rules

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1247091)