Collective rationality and strategy-proofness of group decision rules

DOI10.1007/BF02334315zbMath0378.90007MaRDI QIDQ1247091

Prasanta K. Pattanaik

Publication date: 1976

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06)

Related Items

Restricted preferences and strategyproofness of singlevalued social decision functions, Existence of stable situations, restricted preferences, and strategic manipulation under democratic group decision rules, Manipulation of social decision functions, A condition for Nash-stability under binary and democratic group decision functions, Characterization of domains admitting nondictatorial social welfare functions and nonmanipulable voting procedures, Restricted domains, Arrow social welfare functions and noncorruptible and nonmanipulable social choice correspondences: The case of private and public alternatives, Special domains and nonmanipulability, Restricted domains, Arrow-social welfare functions and noncorruptible and nonmanipulable social choice correspondences: The case of private alternatives

Cites Work

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