Collective rationality and strategy-proofness of group decision rules
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Publication:1247091
DOI10.1007/BF02334315zbMATH Open0378.90007MaRDI QIDQ1247091FDOQ1247091
Authors: Prasanta K. Pattanaik
Publication date: 1976
Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)
Cites Work
- Social choice and individual values
- Non-cooperative games
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- Exceptional Paper—Lexicographic Orders, Utilities and Decision Rules: A Survey
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
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- Stability in Voting
- Threats, Counter-Threats, and Strategic Voting
Cited In (8)
- Manipulation of social decision functions
- Restricted domains, Arrow-social welfare functions and noncorruptible and nonmanipulable social choice correspondences: The case of private alternatives
- Special domains and nonmanipulability
- Characterization of domains admitting nondictatorial social welfare functions and nonmanipulable voting procedures
- Restricted domains, Arrow social welfare functions and noncorruptible and nonmanipulable social choice correspondences: The case of private and public alternatives
- Restricted preferences and strategyproofness of singlevalued social decision functions
- Existence of stable situations, restricted preferences, and strategic manipulation under democratic group decision rules
- A condition for Nash-stability under binary and democratic group decision functions
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