Special domains and nonmanipulability

DOI10.1016/0165-4896(80)90007-4MaRDI QIDQ1838418zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Fred Roush, Ki Hang Kim

Publication date 1980

Published in Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(80)90007-4

zbMATH Keywords

nondictatorial, nonmanipulable social choice functionrestricted domainsstrategyproofness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Cites work

• A condition for Nash-stability under binary and democratic group decision functions
• Characterization of domains admitting nondictatorial social welfare functions and nonmanipulable voting procedures
• Collective rationality and strategy-proofness of group decision rules

Cited in

(12)

• Another induction proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem
• A new informational base for social choice
• Dictatorship on top-circular domains
• Individual versus group strategy-proofness: when do they coincide?
• Structured preferences: a literature survey
• The publications of Ki Hang Kim
• Unanimous and strategy-proof probabilistic rules for single-peaked preference profiles on graphs
• Kelly's conjecture
• Hotelling-Downs equilibria: moving beyond plurality variants
• Tops-only domains
• Circular domains
• On the equivalence of coalitional and individual strategy-proofness properties

This page was built for publication: Special domains and nonmanipulability

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1838418)