Characterization of domains admitting nondictatorial social welfare functions and nonmanipulable voting procedures

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(77)90019-9zbMath0407.90005OpenAlexW2018007022MaRDI QIDQ1258237

Publication date: 1977

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/234.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

Preferences Social Choice Application of Game Theory Nondictatorial Social Nonmanipulable Voting Welfare Functions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Group preferences (91B10) Social choice (91B14) Mathematical sociology (including anthropology) (91D99)

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