Kelly's conjecture

DOI10.1016/0165-4896(89)90005-XzbMATH Open0692.90002OpenAlexW2062477401WikidataQ123357191 ScholiaQ123357191MaRDI QIDQ584043FDOQ584043

Authors: Fred Roush, Ki Hang Kim 

Publication date: 1989

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(89)90005-x

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zbMATH Keywords

nondictatorial choice functionPareto, strategyproof, singlevalued social social choice function

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

• Characterization of domains admitting nondictatorial social welfare functions and nonmanipulable voting procedures
• Special domains and nonmanipulability
• A new informational base for social choice

Cited In (8)

• Random dictatorship domains
• Tops-only domains
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Set-monotonicity implies Kelly-strategyproofness
• A new informational base for social choice
• Generalizing the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem: partial preferences, the degree of manipulation, and multi-valuedness
• The publications of Ki Hang Kim

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