Tops-only domains
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This paper investigates, for the standard voting model with finite set of alternatives and voters, the characteristics of the domains that induce the property that every strategy-proof social choice function satisfying unanimity, has the tops-only property. Sufficient conditions for strategy-proofness and unanimity to imply tops-onlyness are identified. An algorithm to construct tops-only domains from connected graphs having the set of alternatives as nodes is presented.
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