Tops-only domains
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3339023 (Why is no real title available?)
- A general impossibility result on strategy-proof social choice hyperfunctions
- A new informational base for social choice
- Another direct proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem
- Dictatorial domains
- Efficient and strategy-proof voting rules: A characterization
- Generalized median voter schemes and committees
- Kelly's conjecture
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Multi-valued strategy-proof social choice rules
- Separable Preferences, Strategyproofness, and Decomposability
- Single-peaked orders on a tree
- Special domains and nonmanipulability
- Strategic manipulability without resoluteness or shared beliefs: Gibbard-Satterthwaite generalized
- Strategic manipulation in voting games when lotteries and ties are permitted
- Strategy-proof allocation of multiple public goods
- Strategy-proof division of a private good when preferences are single-dipped
- Strategy-proof resolute social choice correspondences
- Strategy-proof social choice correspondences.
- Strategy-proof voting schemes with continuous preferences
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- The structure of strategy-proof social choice. I: General characterization and possibility results on median spaces
- Voting by committees under constraints
- Voting under constraints
Cited in
(36)- Trade-off between manipulability and dictatorial power: a proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem
- The structure of (local) ordinal Bayesian incentive compatible random rules
- Strategy-proof aggregation rules and single peakedness in bounded distributive lattices
- On strategy-proofness and semilattice single-peakedness
- Topical categories of domains
- Egalitarian equivalence and strategyproofness in the queueing problem
- A characterization of possibility domains in strategic voting
- Uniform random dictatorship: a characterization without strategy-proofness
- Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibility in restricted domains
- Further results on dictatorial domains
- The single-peaked domain revisited: a simple global characterization
- Belief-independence and (robust) strategy-proofness
- A maximal domain for strategy-proof and no-vetoer rules in the multi-object choice model
- Dictatorship on top-circular domains
- Strategy-proof partitioning
- Circular domains
- Two necessary conditions for strategy-proofness: on what domains are they also sufficient?
- Local global equivalence for unanimous social choice functions
- On strategy-proofness and the salience of single-peakedness
- On domains that admit well-behaved strategy-proof social choice functions
- Random mechanism design on multidimensional domains
- Random dictatorship domains
- A taxonomy of non-dictatorial unidimensional domains
- Strategy-proof social choice on multiple and multi-dimensional single-peaked domains
- On single-peaked domains and min-max rules
- Necessary and sufficient conditions for pairwise majority decisions on path-connected domains
- Recent Results on Strategy-Proofness of Random Social Choice Functions
- Flexible majority rules in democracyville: a guided tour
- A characterization of unanimity with status quo: fixed vs variable population
- A characterization of random min-max domains and its applications
- The strategic sincerity of approval voting
- Characterization of self-selective social choice functions on the tops-only domain
- Coalitionally strategyproof functions depend only on the most-preferred alternatives
- On random social choice functions with the tops-only property
- Obvious manipulations of tops-only voting rules
- Unanimity and local incentive compatibility in sparsely connected domains
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